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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Cary W. Hartman appeals from

his conviction

by a jury

inﬂuence of alcohol, drugs, or an intoxicating substance.
its

discretion

by granting the

state’s

motion

He

for felony driving under the

argues that the district court abused

t0 permit forensic testimony

by Video teleconference

under Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Cary W. Hartman was charged With operating a motor vehicle while under the inﬂuence
0f drugs 0r an intoxicating substance, enhanced to a felony because the
convicted

guilty.

at least

twice before within the previous ten years.

state alleged

(R., pp.24-25.)

he had been

Hartman pled not

(R., p.27.)

The

state

moved

under Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 to permit Sarah Pickle, a

pre-trial

forensic scientist at the Idaho State Forensic Laboratory in Pocatello t0 testify Via Video

teleconference. (R., pp.34-35.)

At a hearing 0n

testimony was going t0 be “pretty dry[,]
forensic testimony that

you see

in

.

.

.

the motion, the state argued that

Ms. Pickle’s

very straightforward and hardly different from the

most cases.”

(Tr. V01.

I,

p.5, Ls.20-22.1)

Hartman’s counsel

responded that While he would ordinarily not object t0 a request to present such testimony by
Video teleconference, he was doing so in this case because Ms. Pickle was going to be, “in some

ways, the most crucial Witness in the State’s case.”

1

(Tr. V01.

I,

p.6,

L.12 — p.7, L.13.) That was

Following Hartman (Appellant’s

hearing 0n the state’s motion
V01.

II.”

The former

473 12.pdf’ and the

is

latter

brief, p.2 n2), the state will refer t0 the transcript of the
“Tr.
Vol. I” and the transcript 0f the two-day jury trial as “Tr.
as

contained in the ﬁle titled “Transcript Lodged

— Supreme Court N0

begins 0n page sixteen of the ﬁle titled “Trans.-Hartman.pdf.”

so,

DUI

he argued, because the

case against

Hartman was based 0n a blood draw

Ambien, methamphetamine, and amphetamine, and Ms. Pickle conducted
stated that he did not “plan

0n

that

that test.

found

(Id.)

calling her a liar or anything like that,” but that live testimony

He
was

necessary t0 present the jury an adequate opportunity t0 evaluate the testimony and Ms. Pickle’s

credibility.

(Tr. V01.

I,

p.7,

L.14 — p.8, L.1.)

Hartman’s counsel told the
grant the motion, but that

Ls.2-5.)

Asked by

it

district court that

was “our preference”

the court

it

that

was

“totally in

Ms. Pickle

what standard governed

its

your discretion” Whether t0

testify in court.

(Tr. V01.

I,

p.8,

evaluation of the motion, Hartman’s

counsel reiterated that the determination whether t0 grant the motion was discretionary, but that
the “predominant factor to be weighed”

confront witnesses.

court needed t0

state

(Tr. Vol.

I,

p.8,

was

the constitutional right to cross-examine and

L.14 — p.9, L.10.)

make “a ﬁnding of necessity

The court asked

the state whether the

in this case” in order to grant the

responded by acknowledging that there was n0 necessity, but agreeing that whether to grant

the motion

was

discretionary with the district court.

(Tr. Vol.

I,

p.10, Ls.9-19.)

the district court, Hartman’s counsel agreed that the state did not need t0

agreed, again, that

I,

motion and the

p.10, L.20

The

it

— p.1 1,

was

in the district court’s discretion

Asked again by

show

necessity and

whether to grant the motion.

(Tr. V01.

L.8.)

district court

granted the motion. The court stated:

A11 right. So here’s Where this

is

going t0 land. There’s, 0f course, the

preeminent case 0n the use of Video testimony during

Supreme Court

case.

abuser, and they did

It
it

was a case involving a

trial, is

Maryland

V. Craig, a

child testifying against a sexual

0ne-way. The U.S. Supreme Court allowed

it

in that case.

Here we’re proposing two-way testimony, which is the standard set out
43.2, and there are speciﬁc safeguards in 43.2 that include, for instance,

in

Rule

that the

Witness has t0 be able to see the defendant and the defendant has t0 be able to see
the Witness.

Maryland

In that case,
t0

show
was

part

the Video

V. Craig,

was necessary

it

was a tWO-part

test.

The

State did

The second

ﬁthher important public policy.

t0

have

the reliability 0f the testimony otherwise assured.

There’s a case on appeal on this question out of Canyon County.
the case of State V.

Woods.

This

is

This

is

Idaho Supreme Court N0. 45094, and the

now

question presented in that case that’s pending right

is

whether 43.2

is

permissible in light 0f that Supreme Court case, particularly that ﬁrst prong under
Craig, Whether the State

arguing

is

Both

that.

is

has shown necessity for

is

Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, from the Second Circuit,
to-face confrontation include:

1,

the opportunity 0f the fact ﬁnder t0 observe the

met When the Witness can see

different standard.

make

its

Which would be present here;
demeanor evidence 0r the jury

When

4,

testifying in his presence,

Supreme Court held

The question then goes

t0

—

this is

that there’s

What

no absolute

Instead, there

trial.

determination of the credibility 0f the Witness.

I’ll

Which

I

call the

is

evidence as

They may 0r may not

could be adequately done by the Video
be the guardian to make sure it’s an adequate feed, both audio
it

and Video, t0 make sure that’s the case.
So the parties are arguing prong two 0f Craig. That’s the dispute. On
basis, Iwill ﬁnd for the prosecution, and we will proceed to trial under 43.2.
(Tr. V01.

I,

Ms. Pickle

p.1

L. 9

1,

—

p.13, L.12 (verbatim).)

that

The court then issued a written order allowing

to testify Via Video teleconference. (R., p.5 1 .)

Hartman’s

trial

was held over two days

testimony from four witnesses in

was a

a

scope of 43.2 would be sufﬁcient for the jury

believe the Witness in this case, but

conference, and

3,

t0

reduce risk the witness will

meeting of witnesses during

to that, forensic testimony within the
t0

would be

the defendant. A11 four parts 0f that test are met.

In that State V. Craig, the U.S.
right to a face-to-face

the

test,

in a case called U.S. V.

says the salutary effects 0f face-

it

And

That would also be here.

wrongfully implicate against the defendant
is

Neither party

giving of testimony under oath, which

here; 2, the opportunity for cross—examination,

see the witness.

And

otherwise assured.

it.

of the second

parties are arguing the question

of the testimony

reliability

--

necessary

driver

Who,

at

its

in February

of 2019.

case in chief, with Ms. Pickle testifying

around ﬁve in the morning on February

14,

The

state

last.

Its

presented

ﬁrst Witness

2018, observed a vehicle swerve

across several lanes of 1-84, crash into a concrete barrier, and then swerve back across those lanes

and crash

into a metal barrier.

(Tr. V01.

II,

p.122, L.3

—

p.125, L.19.)

An

Idaho State Police

ofﬁcer testiﬁed that he arrived 0n scene and the driver and sole occupant 0f the vehicle that
crashed,

who he

identiﬁed as Hartman, was in and out of consciousness in an ambulance

(Tr.

V01.

II,

p.158, L.12

— p.162, L.24)

with potentially life-threatening
V01.

II,

p.168, L.21

(Tr. V01.

II,

—

and, because

injuries,

p.169, Ls.8—15.)

An

to the hospital

he was not able to perform any ﬁeld sobriety

At the

p.169, L.7).

Hartman was taken immediately

Hartman agreed

hospital,

t0 provide a

emergency room nurse testiﬁed

tests (Tr.

blood sample.

he took samples 0f

that

Hartman’s blood and that Hartman had not been given methamphetamine 0r Zolpidem (brand

name, ‘Ambien’) prior
Pickle

testiﬁed

to that

Video

Via

blood draw.

(Tr. V01.

teleconference

that

methamphetamine, amphetamine, and Zolpidem.

II,

—

p.137, L.1

Hartman’s

(Tr. Vol.

II,

p.139, L.16.) Finally, Ms.

blood

tested

p.215, L.8

positive

— p.216,

for

L.1; p.228,

L.16 — p.229, L.4.)

Hartman testiﬁed

in his defense.

He

accident, over-the-counter cold medications,

p.278, L.25.)

much

He

and he used an

Ambien

the night before the

(Tr. Vol.

inhaler.

II,

p.277, L.8

—

claimed that he recalled swerving to avoid another vehicle, but did not recall

6156.2 (Tr. V01.

As

testiﬁed that he took

p.279, L.1

II,

— p.280,

L.17.)

who

a rebuttal witness, the state called a pharmacologist

testiﬁed that none of the

medications 0r products that Hartman testiﬁed he had taken would contain methamphetamine or
give rise to a positive blood test for methamphetamine. (Tr. V01.

The jury returned a
Hartman then admitted
(Tr. V01.

II,

that

p.343, L.12

guilty verdict.

(Tr. V01.

II,

L.3; p.347, L.4

uniﬁed term of ten years with two years ﬁxed.

p.292, L.11

p.338, L.9

he had been twice convicted of

— p.344,

II,

— p.348,

DUI
L.6.)

—

— p.293,

L.7.)

p.339, L.3; R., p.67.)

Within the previous ten years.

Hartman was sentenced

(R., pp.106-09.)

He

timely appealed.

to a

(R.,

pp.110-13.)

2

The other

V01.

II,

driver

who

witnessed the crash testiﬁed that she did not see any other vehicles. (Tr.

p.126, Ls.13-17.)

IS SUE

Hartman
Did

states the issue

0n appeal

the district court abuse

scientist t0 testify Via

its

as:

discretion

When

it

allowed the State’s forensic

Video teleconference?

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Hartman
state’s

failed t0

show

that the district court

abused

its

motion under I.C.R. 43.2 and permitting forensic testimony

teleconference?

discretion
to

by granting

the

be presented Via Video

ARGUMENT
When It Granted The

Hartman Has Not Shown That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
State’s Motion Under Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2
A.

Introduction

Hartman argues

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

when

permitted the state t0

it

present forensic testimony Via Video teleconference pursuant t0 Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 both

because

it

failed to recognize its discretion

Hartman’s argument
the

is

and because

based exclusively 0n the

Supreme Court of the United

States,

Magland V.

neither that

standard.

right t0 confront witnesses.

it

failed to understand

The

district court

its

The

applied an incorrect legal standard.

fact that the district court discussed a case

Craig,

with the conditions under which testimony Via Video

Amendment

it

is

from

497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990), concerned

compatible with the defendant’s Sixth

district court’s

discussion 0f that case suggests

decision as discretionary or that

it

applied an incorrect legal

repeatedly clariﬁed with both parties that

its

determination was

discretionary and the discussion allegedly reﬂecting the application 0f an incorrect legal standard

was responsive

to

Hartman’s argument below, cited and discussed a case 0n point, and explicitly

addressed the standard articulated in Rule 43.2. The

B.

Standard

“When
Whether the

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion.

Of Review

reviewing a lower court’s decision for an abuse 0f discretion,

trial court: (1)

this

Court analyzes

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted Within the

m

outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable t0 the

speciﬁc choices available t0

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

Do_bm, 166 Idaho 202, 457 P.3d 854, 855 (2020)
omitted).

by

the exercise of reason.”

(internal quotation

marks and brackets

C.

Hartman Has Not Shown That The

District Court

Abused

Its

Discretion

Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 provides that “[ﬂorensic testimony

may be

offered

by Video

teleconference” Where the following conditions are met:

(1)

The court and

the forensic scientist

must be able

t0 see

and hear each other

simultaneously and communicate With each other during the proceeding.

(2)

The defendant, counsel from both

sides,

scientist must be
communicate With each other

and the forensic

able t0 see and hear each other simultaneously and

during the proceeding.

(3)

A defendant Who

is

represented

by counsel must be

able t0 consult privately

with defense counsel during the proceeding.
I.C.R. 43.2(a).3

As Hartman acknowledges,

the determination Whether to permit the introduction

of testimony Via Video teleconference under that rule
(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-1

the district court’s discussion 0f

In CLaig, the

at the

district

court’s discretion.

1.)

Hartman’s argument for the claim that the

pp.12-14.)

is

Maryland

district court

V. Craig,

Supreme Court of

abused

its

discretion focuses

497 U.S. 836 (1990).

on

(Appellant’s brief,

the United States considered a Sixth

Amendment,

Confrontation Clause challenge t0 a Maryland statute permitting child Victims of sexual abuse t0
testify Via

0ne-way Video.

Li. at 840-43.

The Court held

that the right to confront Witnesses

includes a “preference” for physical, face-to-face confrontation, but that the Confrontation Clause

does not always require

it.

1g. at

satisﬁed absent a physical,

confrontation

3

The

is

849-50.

face-to-face

“[The] right t0 confront accusatory Witnesses

confrontation at

only where denial of such

necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability

rule also provides various notice requirements

testimony on the party seeking
issue here.

trial

may be

its

introduction.

and places the burden 0f coordinating the
Those provisions are not at

I.C.R. 43.2(b)-(d).

of the testimony

is

otherwise assured.” Li. at 850. Thus,

Lag imposed two requirements for the

use of Video testimony t0 comport with the Confrontation Clause: (1) a necessity requirement,
that the presentation

0f Video testimony be necessary t0 further an important public policy; and

(2) a reliability requirement, that

it

have the guarantees 0f

reliability associated

With in-court

testimony.

Hartman argues

that the district court

confused the standard articulated in CLaig, which

“governs the constitutionality of [Video] testimony,” With the appropriate analysis under Idaho
Criminal Rule 43.2, which “grants discretion t0 the

According

district court.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

Hartman, there was no constitutional challenge raised below (Appellant’s

t0

p.12 n.6), but the district court

still

brief,

“superimposed the Craig standard onto I.C.R. 43.2.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) That alleged confusion, he claims, resulted in the district court abusing

its

discretion in

its

decision

two ways.

was

it

requirements of the CLaig

“In employing the Craig

test,

the district court did not recognize

(Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)

discretionary.”

court understood that

Hartman, “the

First,

Instead,

he claims, the

had

to permit the

testimony to be offered by Video

test

were satisﬁed.

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

district court

applied Craig” and “Viewed

its

In each case, his evidence

in the course

is

simply that the

if the

two

Second, according t0

decision through the narrow lens 0f

necessity and reliability” rather than considering the totality of the circumstances.

brief, p.13.)

district

district court cited

(Appellant’s

and discussed CLaig

of concluding that testimony Via Video teleconference would provide an adequate

opportunity for Hartman t0 challenge and for the jury to assess the credibility of Ms. Pickle’s
(Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)

testimony.

show

that

it

abused

its

discretion.

The

district court’s

discussion of that case does not

acted consistently With the applicable legal standards, simply

First, the district court

addressing the issues raised by the parties and the factors articulated in Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2.

When asked by

In opposing the state’s motion,

the district court

how

it

should evaluate that

motion, Hartman argued that “the predominant factor t0 be weighed” by the

district court

was

“the right, constitutionally, to cross-examine and confront witnesses at trial.”

(Tr. Vol.

p.8,

Ls.14-25.4)

He

stated the state’s

particular Witness.”

He

(Id.)

motion was “an issue of cross—examination and confronting

(Tr. V01.

should not exercise

I,

and assessing Ms. Pickle’s

L.14 — p.8, L.1.) Thus, Hartman’s argument that the

p.7,

district court

discretion to permit the testimony Via Video teleconference hinged

its

this

argued that testimony Via Video teleconference would be less

effective than live testimony for purposes 0f cross-examination

credibility.

I,

on the

claim that a Video teleconference would not be sufﬁcient t0 vindicate his right t0 confront Ms.
Pickle and

would not provide an adequate opportunity

Much

assess credibility.

articulated in

4

0f CLaig—and, in particular, the second,

Craig—is addressed exactly

Hartman concedes on appeal

Clause objection below.
conclude that the
motion.

state

(Tr. V01.

I,

was not sufﬁcient

reliability

that

one

Inc.,

requirement

to raise a constitutional, Confrontation

Hartman had made a

constitutional

be no error by the district court. He invited the district court t0
did not need t0 show necessity for the district court to grant the state’s
is

20 — p.1

n0 reversible

1,

L.5.)

Therefore, even if he did

make

a constitutional

error in the district court’s failure to consider

Davison

163 Idaho 571, 575, 416 P.3d 943, 947 (2018) (“Idaho law

may not

t0

which Video testimony can serve the

Video testimony was necessary t0 further an important public policy.

Plumbing,

and for the jury

still

p.10, L.

objection below, there

that this

t0 the extent to

(Appellant’s brief, p.12 n.6.) If

would

obj ection below, there

for cross—examination

is

V.

Whether
Debest

well established

successfully complain of errors one has consented t0 or acquiesced

in.

In other

words, invited errors are not reversible.”). And, of course, on the assumption that Hartman
a constitutional objection below,

it

would not be

made

error for the district court to consider the

remaining requirement 0f CLaig that Hartman contested—whether the Video testimony would be
a reliable substitute for in—court testimony.

purposes 0f live testimony, provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination, and permit
the jury to assess credibility. CLaig,

The

district court

497 U.S.

at

845-46, 851-52.

discussed CLaig and other cases relevant t0 the question Whether

Video testimony can provide a reliable substitute for live testimony in evaluating Hartman’s

argument that

between the

would

it

parties.

which the

not,

(Tr. V01.

I,

p.1

1,

district court correctly

—

L.9

p.13, L.8.)

recognized as the disputed issue

The court

correctly noted that “there are

speciﬁc safeguards in 43.2” that are directed to ensuring that testimony presented in accordance

with the rule provides an adequate alternative t0 live testimony.

(Tr. V01.

I,

noted that Ms. Pickle’s testimony would be under oath; there would be a
cross—examination; the jury

to see

Hartman.

(Tr. Vol.

the scope of 43.2

would be able

p.12, Ls.9-21.)

I,

would be sufﬁcient

the witness,” stating that

p.13),

it

district court

Ms.

make

its

full

1,

Ls.15-19.)

opportunity for

concluded that “testimony within
determination 0f the credibility 0f

the “guardian” to ensure that the audio and Video

(Tr. Vol.

I,

p.12, L.25

It

and Ms. Pickle would be able

Pickle;

Finally, the court

for the jury t0

would be

it

sufﬁcient for that to be the case.

complains the

t0 observe

p.1

—

p.13, L.8.)

was

Though Hartman

did not consider the totality of the circumstances (Appellant’s brief,

considered his argument below and the factors that are discussed in Rule 43.2.

an abuse of discretion for the

district court to

It is

not

address Hartman’s argument by, in part, discussing

a Supreme Court case relevant t0 that argument and by considering the factors speciﬁcally
articulated in Idaho Criminal

Nor

Rule 43.2.

did the district court

asked the parties Whether
was. (Tr. V01.

I,

its

fail t0

recognize

its

discretion.

The

district court

repeatedly

determination was discretionary and both parties responded that

p.8, Ls.2-5; p.8,

L.14 — p.9, L.10; p.10, L.9 — p.1

1,

L.8.)

There

is

it

nothing in the

record t0 suggest that the district court thought otherwise. In support of his claim that the district

10

court failed to recognize

its

discretion,

Hartman points only

to the district court’s discussion

0f

CLaig and his argument that a Video teleconference would be inadequate to assess Ms. Pickle’s
testimony.

and determined

shows

That the

(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.)

it

had no

discretion.

that the district court thought CLaig required

sort.

As

which Video testimony

discussed above,

is

will not

it

Lag is

would be

It

which a

(2019) (Where

that

it

did so.

district court’s

E

odd

to

suppose

motion When CLaig says

concerned only With the circumstances under

district court

It

does not say or imply that

must permit Video testimony. There

for the proposition that the district court misread

assume

particularly

t0 grant the state’s

compatible with the Confrontation Clause.

there are any circumstances under

no support

Hartman’s argument

to exercise its discretion to permit the testimony Via Video teleconference hardly

that the district court believed

nothing 0f the

district court rejected

Laig

is

so dramatically and this Court

State V. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 610,

434 P.3d 209, 214

discussion could be read as compatible With the applicable legal

standard, electing to read the district court in that way).

Next, even
State V.

if the district court

did

somehow abuse

Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 723, 249 P.3d 1169, 1178

discretionary ruling has been tainted

remand the matter

for a

discretion,

n0 remand

it is

legal 0r factual error,

we

is

necessary.

vacate the decision and

trial court.

However, a

apparent from the record that the result would not change or

would represent an abuse of discretion.”

(internal citations omitted».

apparent from the record here that the result would not change on remand.

testimony

is

App. 2010) (“Ordinarily, When a

(Ct.

new, error-free discretionary determination by the

remand may be avoided where
that a different result

by a

its

exactly the sort of testimony that Rule 43.2

teleconference, and for exactly the reason that the state

11

moved to

is

It is

Ms. Pickle’s

intended t0 allow by Video

present

it

that

way.

The

rule [I.C.R. 43.2]

was prompted by

Who

the fact that the state experts

analyze

blood, breath, and urine are located in Coeur d’Alene or Pocatello. Allowing

by Video teleconference

forensic testimony

Will not only help alleviate the travel

costs associated With forensic testimony, but Will also allow those laboratories to

operate

more efﬁciently

as

back 0n time the forensic

Will cut

it

scientists are

traveling 0r waiting in a courtroom and thus help with the turnaround time in test
results.

This

is

a beneﬁt to both the state and defendants.

Catherine Derden, Highlights of the 2011 Rule Amendments, 54 Advocate 40, 42 (201
appeal, though he did not do so below,

Hartman suggests

Ada County was

requiring Ms. Pickle to drive from Pocatello to

the state’s motion. (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)

0f the rule

itself

that saving the time

But

intended t0 apply.

why the

As promised by

is

Nor

is

there

II,

p.5, Ls.20-22.)

p.216, L.15

the state,

She testiﬁed as

— p.247,

L.7.)

Which the

to the nature

Though Ms.

0f the

tests

and the

may be

you see

in

dry[,]

The

.

.

.

most cases.”

was important,

results.

is

very

(Tr.

(Tr.

the rule does

presented Via Video teleconference.

(Tr. Vol.

I,

p.7, Ls.1-13), after

determined as a matter of fact that a Video teleconference would

nevertheless provide the jury an adequate opportunity to assess the testimony (Tr. V01.

Ls.1-8).

text

there any reasonable

conducted and their

Pickle’s testimony

argued below that the testimony was important

district court

is

Ms. Pickle’s testimony was “pretty

not provide that only unimportant forensic testimony

And Hartman

rule exists

exactly the sort of “forensic testimony” to Which the rule

straightforward and hardly different from the forensic testimony that

V01.

and expense of

provides no indication that there must be some other, more pressing reason to

dispute that Ms. Pickle’s testimony

I,

On

not a sufﬁcient reason to grant

that is precisely

introduce forensic testimony Via Video teleconference.

V01.

1).

district court is

not going to

come

to a different conclusion

1.,

p.13,

when presented with the

same argument on remand.
Finally, if all

of the above

“remand [Hartman’s] case

for a

is

new

incorrect

trial,” as

and a remand

is

necessary, the Court should not

he requests. (Appellant’s

12

brief, p.15.)

Instead, the

Court should “remand the matter for a new, error-free discretionary determination by the

Truman, 150 Idaho

court.”

at

723, 249 P.3d at 1178.

If the

trial

Court were t0 remand for that

determination and the district court were to reach the same result, as the state asserts that

almost certainly would, n0
error

free—a new

trial

that

trial

would be necessary.

In that event, the ﬁrst trial

would present the same evidence

determines that a remand
state’s

new

is

necessary,

it

in the

should remand for the

district court t0

motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 43.2 With instructions

motion

is

same way.

t0 conduct a

it

would be

If this

Court

reconsider the

new

trial

only

if

denied.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm Hartman’s judgment of conviction.

DATED this 29th day 0f April, 2020.
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Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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